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Abstract 
This paper describes a dynamic system for the interrelationships between happiness and health that 
considers three main attitudes to life: α, β, and γ for Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic, respectively. 
All variables that have been shown by empirical and theoretical studies to affect individual health 
and happiness are included (i.e., employment, occupation, education, ethical freedom, equity in 
achievements). Three main approaches are considered: behavioural and statistical ex-ante, and ex-
post behavioural. I develop the model to rank the three attitudes in terms of health for a given 
happiness level, and consequently, provide insights into which attitude should be adopted by each 
individual, according to their characteristics: individuals in Protestant and non-Protestant Christian 
societies should adopt β and γ attitudes, respectively; educated individuals should adopt a γ attitude; 
and poor individuals should adopt an α attitude. Based on this analysis, I provide insights into 
which attitude actually is adopted by each society by comparing predicted health and achievement 
levels with the observed life expectancy at birth and per capita gross domestic product levels in 107 
countries, thus providing an empirical test of the analytical model. This analysis revealed a 
prevalence of β attitudes in Protestant Developed Countries, with larger γ shares in less income-
unequal countries; a prevalence of γ attitudes in non-Protestant Christian Developed Countries, with 
larger β shares in more income-unequal countries; a prevalence of α attitudes in Muslim Less 
Developed Countries, with larger γ shares in more educated countries; and a prevalence of β 
attitudes in more educated atheist and Jewish countries. 
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1.Introduction 
Many empirical studies have shown a positive impact of health on happiness. For example, Binder 
and Coad (2011) associated health status with quintiles for happiness after controlling for income 
and education. Peiro (2006) compared health status with satisfaction or happiness after controlling 
for age, marital status, and employment. Pedersen & Schmidt (2011) examined the effects of the 
level of and changes in self-reported health on life satisfaction after controlling for the level of and 
changes in income and labour status. Becchetti & Rossetti (2009) accounted for the effects of health 
deterioration on frustrated achievement after controlling for the lack of a full-time job, relative 
income, marital status shocks, and a poorer social life. Yakovlev & Leguizamon (2012) examined 
the effects of high and middle education levels, income, and health on self-reported happiness after 
controlling for age, trust, stress, temperature, religion, and rainfall. 
A few empirical studies have shown a positive impact of happiness on health. For example, 
Blanchflower & Oswald (2008) compared blood pressure with happiness across nations. Binder & 
Coad (2010) found increases in well-being associated with subsequent increases in health, together 
with increases in income, marriage, and employment, but decreases in well-being associated with 
increases in income, marriage, and employment. Diener & Chan (2011) associated life satisfaction, 
the absence of negative emotions, optimism, and the presence of positive emotions with better 
health and longevity. 
In addition, many empirical studies have shown significant impacts of various determining factors 
on both happiness and health. For example, Kiyani et al. (2011) examined the effect of athletic 
status on mental health and happiness. Oshio & Kobayashi (2010) examined the effects of regional 
inequality on happiness and self-rated health after controlling for gender, age, educational 
attainment, income, occupational status, and political views. Borgonovi (2008) examined the effects 
of volunteer work on self-reported health and happiness. Andersson (2008) compared self-
employed vs. salaried workers in terms of their job and life satisfaction and mental and general 
health after controlling for physically and mentally stressful jobs. Gatab & Pirhayti (2012) 
examined the effects of regular group exercise on happiness, physical symptoms, depression, social 
functioning and general health. Salary & Shaieri (2013) examined the effects of an eccentric 
personality on psychological dissociation and satisfaction after controlling for social commitment, a 
positive mood, a feeling of control, and self-consciousness. Haji et al. (2011) examined the effects 
of life skills training on happiness and psychological health after controlling for emotional 
regulation, social relationships, and physical situations. Bostani & Saiiari (2011) examined the 
effects of an athletic life on stress tolerance and self-assertiveness (combined with happiness) and 
mental health. Maselko & Kubzansky (2006) examined the effects of involvement in religious 
institutions and activities on psychological distress and self-rated health and happiness after 
controlling for gender. Schatz et al. (2012) examined the effects of receiving a pension during 
retirement on health and well-being after controlling for gender. Izquierdo (2005) examined the 
effects of improved acculturation and permanent settlement on a change in health and well-being 
for the Matsigenka of the Peruvian Amazon. Easterlin (2009) examined the effects of the transition 
from socialism to capitalism on material living levels, satisfaction with work, health, and family 
life. 
Note that all of these researchers studied the general population and its health; I have not included 
other studies on the relationship between happiness and health for specific populations such as 
students in schools (e.g., Shayan & Gatab, 2012; Yahyaei et al., 2012; Gatab et al., 2011) or patients 
in hospitals (e.g., Mukuria & Brazier, 2013). Moreover, these studies applied different definitions 
and measures of both happiness and health. In the present study, I will not espouse any particular 
definition of happiness and health nor will I specify any measure of these factors to keep the 
analysis as general as possible, and I will not account for other studies on the impacts of specific 
illnesses on happiness (e.g., Binder and Coad, 2013). Finally, all of these researchers studied both 
happiness and health, so I have disregarded studies that focused only on determinants of one of the 
two parameters. 
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However, my literature review found no analytical studies that described the dynamic interactions 
between happiness and health. Thus, the first purpose of this paper was to develop a dynamic 
system of equations that could account for all individual determinants that were investigated by the 
abovementioned empirical studies, with the goal being to characterise alternative long-run equilibria 
for happiness and health based on different attitudes to life. I selected very general assumptions; I 
disregarded all contextual determinants (e.g., temperature or rainfall). A by-product of this first 
purpose will be a ranking of attitudes in terms of individual health and achievements for a given 
level of happiness as a function of individual characteristics. 
In particular, I will tell the following story: 
• Each individual receives a feasible stock (fs) of opportunities from their family, which 
translates into economic and physical flows of countable opportunities per period. These flows 
are affected by personal uncertainty (u) and ethical freedom (fr). 
• Each individual is aware of the relationship between happiness (ha) and health (he). In 
particular, current health at time t (he[t]) affects current happiness (ha[t]), whereas past 
happiness (ha[t–1] and ha[t–2]) affects current health, with a persistent effect on the personal 
mood. If people are not aware of this relationship, they could choose paths to happiness and 
health that instead lead to despair desperation or illness. 
• Each individual is aware of the physical and psychological stress (δ) that arises from improving 
their economic or social status and from pursuing higher and higher achievements (y); however, 
this stress might be negligible for some people. Needless to say, δ refers to perceived inner 
sensations rather than revealed sentiments, and simulating feelings can actually increase the 
psychological stress. 
• Each individual seeks a long-run equilibrium for happiness and health (ha* and he*). In 
particular, if their physical stress is negligible (δ=0), they will accept oscillations in their 
achievements, happiness, and health if this leads towards a long-run equilibrium; if their 
physical stress is positive (δ>0), they will take actions to move towards their achievement, 
happiness, and health equilibrium. If people have an incorrect perception of this stress, they 
may choose paths to achievement, happiness, and health paths that instead lead to despair 
desperation or illness. 
• Each individual can choose from among three alternative attitudes towards life: α=seeking 
relative improvements in terms of their opportunities, which represents an Aristotelian attitude; 
β=seeking relative increases in achievements per period, which represents an Epicurean 
attitude; and γ=seeking relative improvements in terms of the reference group’s average 
achievements, which represents a Stoic attitude. These choices are made according to the 
expected values of achievements, happiness, and health or according to the individual’s degree 
of optimism or pessimism for a given educational level, relative economic and social status, 
ethical freedom, occupation type, and employment status. These approaches could lead to 
different choices. 
Note that this analytical approach is both individually cross-cultural, since it depicts alternative 
attitudes (α, β, γ), and socially cross-cultural, since it considers different ethical freedom . 
Moreover, the model accounts for both ex-ante and ex-post perspectives, as it calculates 
achievement, happiness, and health at given uncertainty values (i.e., behavioural ex-ante such as “I 
am optimistic” or behavioural ex-post, such as “an unsolvable problem happened to me”), and the 
expected achievement, happiness, and calculates health over all values of uncertainty (i.e., statistical 
ex-ante such as “I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic, and any positive or negative events could 
happen to me”). Finally, the approach is both individually cross-developmental, as it depicts 
alternative education and safety occupation levels, and socially cross-developmental; indeed, 
different income distributions are considered. 
The second purpose of this paper was to apply the analytical model to determine how well it can 
explain the observed differences in health in different countries or cultures in terms of the different 
ethical freedom and attitudes prevailing in those countries or cultures. Although these 
characteristics can be debated, they nonetheless represent plausible starting assumptions for this 
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analysis. A by-product of this second purpose will be that it provides an empirical test of the 
analytical model. 
2.The analytical model 
The purpose of this section is to develop mathematical formulas that represent the dynamic 
interrelationship between happiness ha[t] and health he[t] at time t based on factors that have been 
described in the empirical literature. I will refer to the following variables: 
• an individual’s achievements (y) and their reference group’s average achievement, ay; one 
could think of individual income and the income distribution as proxies for y and ay, 
respectively. 
• the feasible set fs for opportunities, which in turns depends on the individual flows of income 
and health that come from the original family (fy and fh, respectively), on personal uncertainty 
(u[t]), and on ethical freedom (fr); one could use family income and health as proxies for fy and 
fh by solving for fr, whereas one could refer to u[t] as negatively or positively affecting the 
feasible set as a proxy for monetary loss or gain (a change in fy), injury or recovery (a change 
in fh), or any other uncontrolled factors that could reduce or increase the feasible set. 
• the employment status (em), the educational level (ed), and the occupation type (oc); one could 
think of a full-time job, the number of school years, and an unsafe or dangerous job as proxies 
for em, ed, and oc, respectively. 
Note that Powdthavee & van den Berg (2011) highlighted the problems in estimating health in 
monetary terms using a new well-being valuation method, whereas Lelkes (2006) showed that an 
individual’s self-reported life satisfaction could be used as a proxy for utility, whereas commonly 
used measures of well-being can bias a person’s evaluation of their level of satisfaction. Although 
the model is sufficiently general to be consistent with many definitions and measures, self-
perceived happiness and health seem to be the most appropriate for analyses at an individual level. 
In this analysis, I will represent the dynamic interrelationship between happiness and health using 
two dynamic equations, in which normalisations are boldfaced (e.g., fy, fh), and parameters are 
italicized (e.g., ay, ed, fr, me, oc, em): 
 
ha[t]=α{(y[t]-fs)/fs}+β{(y[t]-y[t–1])/y[t–1]}+γ{(y[t]-ay)/ay}+he[t]+em  (1) 
he[t]=fs+∑t-me t–1 ha[t]–δ(y[t]–y[t–1])+y[t]+ed+oc   (2) 
where: 
α=1 or β=1 or γ=1 
fs=fs[t]–fs[t–1]=fy+fh–u[t]+fr 
δ≥0, oc≤0, em≥0, me≥1 
u[t] in [–u*,+u*] 
 
where me is the number of past periods which affect the current the personal mood and u* is the 
long-run equilibrium uncertainty. 
Note that all coefficients are set at 1. One could introduce alternative values based on specific 
econometric analyses, although the qualitative insights would not be altered by this choice. 
Moreover, fs represents the change in the feasible set on which one can rely in the short run; a 
positive fs implies that y[t] can be 0 or negative. Finally, one could introduce –u[t] or +ed in ha[t], 
although these are qualitatively irrelevant at equilibrium, but would double the quantitative effects 
on ha[t], since these variables linearly affect fs and he[t], respectively 
Equations (1) and (2) provide a theoretical framework that justifies the many relationships observed 
between the many variables involved in a linear way. The goals are to obtain an analytical solution, 
permit the use of graphs to reveal insights, achieve an immediate empirical validation, and enable 
future econometric analyses. Alternatively, one could think of equations (1) and (2) as a linearized 
and discretised globally stable solution for the following inter-temporal optimisation problem: 
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Choose y[t] and then α=1 or β=1 or γ=1 to maximise 
∫0∞ ha(y[t], y[t–1], u[t], fr, he[t], em) eε t dt 
s.t. (∂he/∂t){ha[t–1], y[t], y[t–1], ed, oc}=0 
 
where ε=0 implies a co-state variable fixed at ∞ and ε=∞ implies a co-state variable fixed at 0, 
whenever the impact of he on ha is linear. However, this would require the implausible assumptions 
of complete information and inter-temporal rationality. 
Note that many of the parameters and coefficients that I have applied have been estimated in the 
literature. For example, Golden & Wiens-Tuers (2006) showed that mandatory and harmful 
overtime work (δ>0) has a negative impact on self-reported subjective happiness and psychological 
health after controlling for income. Verme (2009) shows that freedom of choice predicts life 
satisfaction better than any other known factor, including health, employment, income, marriage, or 
religion, both across and within countries. Graham et al. (2004) showed that self-esteem and 
optimism improved both wealth and health after controlling for income level, health status, and 
some other factors. Carlsson et al. (2014) showed an intergenerational transmission of happiness 
after controlling for the income, gender, education, health status, marital status, and well-being of 
the parents. Gardner & Oswald (2007) estimated a positive impact of income on psychological 
health. Van Campen & Cardol (2009) showed that physical disabilities reduce happiness through 
participation in paid and volunteer work after controlling for education and age. Brown & Tierney 
(2009) showed a strong negative relationship between religious participation and subjective well-
being after controlling for demographics, health and disabilities, living arrangements, wealth, and 
income. Guney (2011) showed that individuals could be helped to discover strengths such as 
optimism, hope, humour, and resilience.  
In addition, achievements are more likely to be closer to the fs border for β and γ types of attitude 
than for the α type. By stressing that ethical freedom and its social implications (i.e., fr) are 
distinguished from personal attitudes that lack social implications (i.e., α, β, and γ attitudes), in this 
analysis, I will refer to Zagonari (2009) that predicted a negative fr for members of Protestant 
religions and a positive fr for members of non-Protestant Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and 
Hindu religions and for atheists; in addition, I have associated the α, β, and γ attitudes with the 
Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic attitudes to life, respectively. Indeed, α evokes the flourishing of 
personal potentials (i.e., a percentage increase of one’s feasible set), β is attached to an ongoing 
percentage increase in achievements (i.e., meeting one’s current goals or desires), and γ evokes the 
awareness of a common destiny (i.e., a percentage increase over the average conditions of other 
individuals within one’s group). 
3.Analytical results 
The previous section provided mathematical formulas that represent the dynamic interrelationship 
between happiness (ha[t]) and health (he[t]) at time t. In this section, I will characterise the 
equilibrium values for happiness (ha*) and health (he*). I will assume that ha[t]=ha* for each t and, 
consequently, that ∑t-me t–1 ha[t]=me×ha*. Note that the case in which δ>0 and y[t]–y[t–1]≠0 can be 
rejected as implausible; if an individual suffers from a change in achievements (δ>0), they will seek 
to avoid changes, at least at each time t. Next, y is not constrained, since one’s income can increase 
to any extent, and one could also sell their economic or health flows. 
3.1.The equilibrium if δ=0, y[t]–y[t–1]≠0, and β=1 
Let us solve equation (2) for y[t] and for y[t–1] in terms of he*: 
 
y[t]= –ed–fh–fy+he*–me ha–fr–oc+u[t] 
y[t–1]= –ed–fh–fy+he*–me ha–fr–oc+u[t–1] 
 
Let us use these equations in equation (1) for a given ha to obtain the equilibrium u*: 
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u*=u[t]=u[t–1] iff u*=ed+em+fh+fy–he*+me ha+oc+fr 
 
However, y[t]=y[t–1]=y*=0 at u=u*. Thus, if β=1, ha*=he*+em or he*=ha*–me, and the 
equilibrium u* becomes: 
 
u*=u[t]=u[t–1]=ed+em+fh+fy–ha*+me ha*+oc+fr 
 
whereas u[t] as a function of u[t–1] becomes: 
 
u[t]={-[ed oc+em oc+fh oc+fy oc+oc2+(–oc+me oc) ha*+oc fr]/(1–oc)}+{u[t–1]/(1–oc)} 
 
Let us check for the stability conditions of u[t] in terms of u[t–1]: 
 
du[t]/du[t–1]=1/(1–oc) 
u[0]= –[ed oc+em oc+fh oc+fy oc+oc2+ha* (–oc+me oc)+oc fr]/(1–oc) 
 
Thus, u* is globally stable if u[t] is increasing but at a relatively low rate (oc<–1), either with a 
positive y-axis intercept (oc>–ed–em–fh–fy+ha–ha me–fr), a negative y-axis intercept (oc<–ed–em–
fh–fy+ha–ha me–fr), or if u[t] is decreasing but at a relatively low rate (oc>1), with a positive y-axis 
intercept (oc>–ed–em–fh–fy+ha–ha me–fr). Note that he* does not depend on oc at u=u*. 
In other words, if one chooses to have a β attitude, one accepts both changing happiness and health 
levels by increasing achievements in the case of unlucky events, and vice versa. However, it is 
implausible to accept infinitely divergent changes in both happiness and health. Thus, this 
individual will look for a convergent path, and will choose to be a β attitude (a) if they adopt a 
behavioural ex-ante approach, where u*>0 requires them to be optimistic and u*<0 requires them to 
be pessimistic; (b) if they adopt a statistical ex-ante approach, where u*=0; or (c) if they adopt a 
behavioural ex-post approach, where u*>0 requires them to be unlucky and u*<0 requires them to 
be lucky. Note that a change in psychological status (from optimistic to pessimistic or vice versa) or 
in contextual events (from lucky to unlucky or vice versa) might require a change in the attitude 
type to avoid long-run disequilibria. 
3.2.The equilibrium if δ>0, y[t]–y[t–1]=0, and α=1 or γ=1 
By substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and solving for y*, we obtain: 
 
 ∗=
(ℎ +  + 	 − )(α −  −  − ℎ −  + γ + ℎ − ℎ ×  − 	 + )
 × γ + α ×  +  ×  + ℎ(γ + ) + γ × 	 +  × 	 − (γ + )
 
 
We can then substitute y* into equation (2) to obtain he*≥0: 
 
ℎ ∗ 
=  + ℎ +  + ℎ ×  +  + 	 − 
−
(ℎ +  + 	 − )(−α +  +  + ℎ +  − γ − ℎ + ℎ ×  + 	 − )
 × γ + α ×  +  ×  + ℎ(γ + ) + γ × 	 +  × 	 − (γ + )
 
 
where ha*=ha. Note that u is assumed to range from –u* to +u*, whereas he*=ed+fh+fy+ha 
me+oc+fr–u+y* is independent of ay, and y* is independent of oc. 
In other words, if one chooses α or γ attitudes, one rejects changing happiness and health levels by 
fixing equilibrium achievements according to one’s psychological status or contextual events. In 
particular, this individual will choose an α or γ attitude (a) if they adopt a behavioural ex-ante 
approach, they will choose y*, he*, and ha* with u>0 if they are optimistic, or with u<0 if they are 
pessimistic; (b) if they adopt a statistical ex-ante approach, they will choose y*, he*, and ha* with 
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u=0; and (c) if they adopt a behavioural ex-post approach, they will choose y*, he*, and ha* with 
u>0 if they are unlucky, versus u<0 if they are lucky. Note that a change in psychological status 
(from optimistic to pessimistic or vice versa) or in contextual events (from lucky to unlucky or vice 
versa) might require a change in the equilibrium achievements rather than a change in the attitude 
type, although a change in achievements will affect their health in the short-run. 
4.Reasoned insights 
The previous section characterised the equilibrium values for achievements (y*), happiness (ha*), 
and health (he*) for the three attitudes (α, β, and γ). In this section, I will apply these equilibrium 
values to obtain rankings of the three attitudes in terms of y*, ha*, and he* and, consequently, will 
provide insights into which attitude should be adopted by each individual, according to their 
characteristics, and by citizens of each country, according to its characteristics. 
4.1.At an individual level 
In this section, I will present analytical results and graphical insights at an individual level. Let us 
normalise, without loss of generality, fy=ha*=1 (i.e., define a unitary measure), as well as fh=1 and 
em=0 (i.e., the he* axis is fixed at 1). Table 1 presents the first, second, and cross derivatives of the 
optimal y* and he* with respect to fr, ed, and ay, with the other parameters and variables fixed at a 
reference case to make all cases comparable. An increase in ethical freedom (∂fr>0) and an increase 
in education (∂ed>0) would result in the same level of happiness and health, with smaller 
achievements (∂y*<0), regardless of attitudes, whereas an increase in the achievements of others 
(∂ay>0) would require an increase in individual achievements (∂y*>0) for a γ attitude only, unless 
the uncertainty is sufficiently small, in which case people may reach the same status through high 
luck rather than high achievement. In contrast, an increase in ethical freedom (∂fr>0) and an 
increase in education (∂ed>0) would result in the same level of happiness and a higher level of 
health (∂he*>0), with the same achievements, regardless of the attitude, whereas an increase in the 
achievements of others (∂ay>0) would require an increase in the individual health (∂he*>0) for a γ 
attitude only, unless the uncertainty is sufficiently small. Moreover, the second and cross 
derivatives are the same and are symmetrical for y* and he*; this means that indirect effects on he* 
arise from effects on y*. Finally, an increase in ethical freedom (∂fr>0) and an increase in education 
(∂ed>0) would result in the same level of happiness and health with smaller achievements (∂y*<0) 
at an increasing rate (i.e., both decreasing and convex functions) for an α attitude, whereas for a γ 
attitude, an increase in the achievements of others (∂ay>0) would require an increase in individual 
achievements (∂y*>0) at an increasing rate (i.e., an increasing and convex function), unless the 
uncertainty is sufficiently small, but at a decreasing rate if combined with a decrease in ethical 
freedom (∂fr>0) and an increase in education (∂ed>0) (i.e., both increasing and concave functions). 
Table 1.First, second, and cross derivatives of y* and he* at the reference case values (fr=0, ed=0, ay=1, fy=1, 
fh=1, me=1, em=0) for alternative attitudes (α=1, β=1, γ=1) with u in [–u*, +u*]. 
 ∂y* ∂he* ∂y*/∂fr ∂y*/∂ed ∂y*/∂ay 
      
∂fr (–7+6 u-u2)/(3-u)2, –1, –1/2 2/(3–u)2, 0, 1/2 –4/(3–u)3, 0, 0 –1/(3–u)2, 0, 0 0, 0, –1/4 
∂ed 
–[(2–u)/(3–u)], –1, –1/2 1/(3–u), 0, 1/2 –1/(3–u)2, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, –1/4 
∂ay 0, 0, 1/4 (–1+u) 0, 0, 1/4 (–1+u) 0, 0, –1/4 0, 0, –1/4 0, 0, 1/4(1–u) 
 
Let us apply a standard normal distribution to u, with μ=0 and σ=1. Figure 1 to Figure 18 present 
the results of numerical simulations with large ranges of parameter values compared to the values in 
the reference case, to depict specific conditions at an individual level, with the parameters 
normalised to make all cases comparable. Insights based on the average values can be rejected as 
implausible, since they would require risk-neutral individuals who are willing to bet on their lives. 
Note that if oc=0, any u for β=1 will represent an equilibrium. Moreover, fixing ha* at 1 relies on 
the over-determinacy of the dynamic model, with two equilibrium equations and three control 
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variables. Finally, me is set to 1, since larger values together with ha*=1 amount to larger education 
levels. 
Figure 1. The reference case. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc (safe occupation)= 0. 
 
Figure 2. The reference case. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc (safe occupation)= 0. 
 
Figure 3. The reference case. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc (unsafe occupation)=–1.5. 
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Figure 4. A non-Protestant society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=1.5 (high ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 5. A non-Protestant society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=1.5 (high ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 6. A non-Protestant society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=1.5 (large ethical freedom); oc=–1.5 (unsafe occupation). 
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Figure 7. A Protestant society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=–1.5 (low ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 8. A Protestant society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=–1.5 (low ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 9. A Protestant society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=0 (middle 
education); fr=–1.5 (low ethical freedom); oc=–1.5 (unsafe occupation). 
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Figure 10. Low education. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=–2 (low education); 
fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 11. Low education. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=–2 (low education); 
fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 12. Low education. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=–2 (low education); 
fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=–1.5 (unsafe occupation). 
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Figure 13. High education. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=2 (high education); 
fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 14. High education. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=2 (high education); 
fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 15. High education. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=1 (average income); ed=2 (high education); 
fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=–1.5 (unsafe occupation). 
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Figure 16. An income-unequal society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=10 (small income); ed=0 
(middle education); fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 17. An income-unequal society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=10 (small income); ed=0 
(middle education); fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=0 (safe occupation). 
 
Figure 18. An income-unequal society. Blue if α=1, point if β=1, purple if γ=1; ay=10 (small income); ed=0 
(middle education); fr=0 (average ethical freedom); oc=–1.5 (unsafe occupation). 
 
 
The behavioural ex-ante approach can be described with examples: an individual with a low 
educational level (ed=–2) should follow an α attitude if they are pessimistic (u>1), but a γ attitude if 
they are optimistic (u<1). 
The statistical ex-ante approach, based on expected values, leads to the following insights: 
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• In the reference case, for health (Figure 1), 2.38 γ>2.15 α>1 β, whereas for achievements (Figure 
2), 2 β>1.53 γ>1.3 α. However, if the occupation is unsafe (Figure 3), 1 β>0.38 γ>0.31 α and 2 
β>1.81 γ>1.75 α for health and achievements, respectively. 
• In a non-Protestant society, for health (Figure 4), 3.24 γ>2.52 α>1 β, whereas for achievements 
(Figure 5), 2 β>0.76 γ>0.04 α. However, if the occupation is unsafe (Figure 6), 1.67 γ>1 β≈0.98 
α and 2 β>0.81 γ>0.13 α for health and achievements, respectively. 
• In a Protestant society, for health (Figure 7), 1 β>0.67 γ>0.61 α, whereas for achievements 
(Figure 8), 2.09 γ≈2.04 α≈2 β. However, if the occupation is unsafe (Figure 9), 1 β>0.04 α>–0.17 
γ and 2.04 α≈2 β>1.83 γ for health and achievements, respectively. 
• For individuals with a low level of education, for health (Figure 10), 1.36 γ≈1.34 α>1 β, whereas 
for achievements (Figure 11), 2 β=2 γ≈1.98 α . However, if the occupation is unsafe (Figure 12), 
1 β>–0.18 α>–0.19 γ and 2 α=2 β=2 γ for health and achievements, respectively. 
• For individuals with a high level of education, for health (Figure 13), 3.49 γ>2.99 α>1 β, 
whereas for achievements (Figure 14), 2 β>0.51 γ>0.01 α. However, if the occupation is unsafe 
(Figure 15), 1.97 γ>1.48 α>1 β and 2 β>0.52 γ>0.03 α for health and achievements, respectively. 
• In poor families, for health (Figure 16), 2.15 α>1.99 γ>1 β, whereas for achievements (Figure 
17), 2 β>1.30 α>1.14 γ. However, if the occupation is unsafe (Figure 18), 1 β>0.31 α>0.22 γ and 
2 β>1.75 α>1.66 γ for health and achievements, respectively. 
The behavioural ex-post approach can be described with examples: a well-educated individual 
(ed=2) who has problems without solutions (u>0) should adopt an α attitude. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the model suggests that individuals in Protestant and non-Protestant 
societies should adopt a β attitude and a γ attitude, respectively (i.e., ∂∂he*/∂fr∂α>0 and 
∂∂he*/∂fr∂γ>0 with ∂∂he*/∂fr∂α<∂∂he*/∂fr∂γ); educated individuals should adopt a γ attitude (i.e., 
∂∂he*/∂ed∂α>0 and ∂∂he*/∂ed∂γ>0 with ∂∂he*/∂ed∂α<∂∂he*/∂ed∂γ); and poor individuals should 
adopt an α attitude (i.e., ∂∂he*/∂ay∂α>0 and ∂∂he*/∂ay∂γ>0 with ∂∂he*/∂ay∂α>∂∂he*/∂ay∂γ). 
Note that if a β attitude begins with y[t] larger than the equilibrium value, then in the short-run, they 
could obtain larger achievements in their pathways towards equilibrium. Moreover, a persistent 
unlucky event could compromise an individual’s health status, regardless of their chosen attitude, 
particularly if combined with an unsafe occupation. Finally, the convergent path towards 
equilibrium for a β attitude depends on their life experiences (i.e., a long-run equilibrium might not 
exist if optimistic individuals face unlucky events or vice versa and then someone with a β attitude 
could move to α or γ attitudes), whereas any life experience is consistent with reaching an 
equilibrium for α and γ attitudes. 
4.2.At a country level 
Table 2 summarises the suggested attitudes with small ranges of parameter values compared to the 
values in the reference case, to depict representative individuals at a country level. 
Table 2.Suggested attitudes (bold) based on two sets of social characteristics (education and equity). 
  DCs (oc=0) LDCs (oc=–1) 
 Education ay=1 (equal) ay=10 (unequal) ay=1 (equal) ay=10 (unequal) 
Protestant 
(fr=–1.5) 
High (ed=1) 1.94 γ>1 β>0 α    
Middle (ed=0)  1 β>0.74 γ>0.61 α   
Low (ed=–1)     
fr=0 High (ed=1)     
fr=0 Middle (ed=0)     
fr=0 Low (ed=–1)  1.08 α≈1.06 γ ≈1 β  1 β>0 α>0 γ 
Non-Protestant 
(fr=1.5) 
High (ed=1) 3.74 γ>1 β>0 α   1.76 α>1.31 γ>1 β 
Middle (ed=0)     
Low (ed=–1)    1.43 α>1 β≈0.98 γ 
 
Therefore, under the assumption that individuals are observed at their long-run equilibrium attitude, 
the model predicts a prevalence of β and γ attitudes in highly educated Protestant DCs, with a larger 
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proportion of β in more income-unequal countries; a prevalence of γ attitudes in non-Protestant 
Christian DCs; a prevalence of α attitudes in income-unequal LDCs with low educational levels; 
and a prevalence of α and γ attitudes in income-unequal LDCs with high educational levels. 
5.An empirical test of the model 
The previous section provided insights into which attitudes should be adopted by each individual 
according to their characteristics, and which attitudes should be adopted by each society according 
to its characteristics. In this section, I will compare these predictions with observed achievements 
and health to provide an empirical test of the analytical model. 
In this analysis, I will consider equations (1) and (2) from section 2 as depicting a representative 
individual at a country level, where α, β, and γ measure the proportion of a country’s population 
who adopt each attitude type (i.e., α+β+γ=1 instead of α=1 or β=1 or γ=1). Moreover, I will assume 
that u=0 and evaluate y* and he* at u=0 by using an average value approach for the parameter u. 
Finally, I will use life expectancy at birth (LEB) as an indicator of health, average values of per 
capita GDP over 5 years as an achievement indicator, and will distinguish between the pre-
financial-crisis period (2003 to 2007) and post-crisis period (2008 to 2012). I will also normalise the 
values with respect to the average, since the analytical results presented in Section 3 refer to 
equilibrium levels of y and he. In this analysis, I eliminated 38 of 218 countries in the World Bank 
Development Indicators dataset that lacked data on LEB or per capita GDP data in both periods. 
Where only one of the two values was missing, I used the value from the other period to provide the 
missing data.  
To obtain the predicted he* and y* that were compared with the observed LEB and per capita GDP, 
I used the following proxies: ay=1/(1–Gini), where Gini represents the value of the Gini coefficient; 
ed=the enrolment in tertiary school (% of the students), with –1+each value divided by the mean to 
obtain a normalized value; oc=–% industry employment; and em=1–% unemployed with –1+each 
value divided by the mean to obtain a normalized value. In this calculation, I used Gini coefficients 
from the CIA World Fact Book when the  coefficients were missing from the World Bank database. 
I eliminated 50 countries due to lack of data on tertiary education or industry employment, and 23 
countries due to lack of data on Gini coefficients. 
Table S in Supplementary Materials shows the calculated fr values for each country, which make 
the predicted health he*consistent with the observed LEB for given values of per capita GDP, ay, 
ed, oc, and em. 
As expected, apart from the atheist KOR and the former English colonies QAT and IRL, 
significantly negative fr (i.e., fr<–1 in both periods) were obtained for Protestant DCs (AUS, CHE, 
DNK, FIN, IRL, ISL, LUX, NLD, NOR, SWE, and USA) in both periods. In contrast, a negative fr 
was observed only in the first period in BEL, GBR, GRC, and KWT, and only in the second period 
in AUT, CHE, HKG, and NZL. 
To obtain insights on the relative proportions of the population who adopted the α, β, and γ 
attitudes, I used the calculated fr to compare the observed per capita GDP (y°) and calculated the 
equilibrium income (y*) at different pairs of extreme values for α and γ (i.e., α=0 and γ=0, α=1 and 
γ=0, α=0 and γ=1, α=1 and γ=1). To do so, I relied on the negative impacts of both α and γ on the 
estimated income (see Appendix for details). In particular, if y*–y°>0 at α=0 and γ=0, then both α 
and γ must increase to reduce the overestimate of y*; if y*–y°>0 at α=1 and γ=0, then γ must 
increase to reduce the overestimate of y*; if y*–y°>0 at α=0 and γ=1, then α must increase to reduce 
the overestimate of y*; and if y*–y°<0 at α=1 and γ=1, then both α and γ must decrease to increase 
the underestimate of y*. Table S in Supplementary Materials shows the calculated differences 
between the observed per capita GDP and the calculated income (i.e., y*–y°). Table 3 summarises 
the description of the countries as having either single dominant or co-dominant attitude types. 
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Table 3.Estimated attitudes as a function of a country’s social characteristics (religion and education); * means  
“an attitude suggested by a religion”; ¬ means “different from”; ≈ means “similar to”. Latin American (LA) 
countries: ARG, BLZ, BOL, CRI, ECU, GTM, HND, PAN, PER, PRY, URY, and VEN. Mid-educated ex-SU 
(former members of the Soviet Union with middle educational levels): BGR, ROU, and SVN. High-educated ex-
SU (former members of the Soviet Union with high educational levels): CZE, EST, HUN, LTU, LVA, and RUS. 
Low Educated Muslim (Muslim countries with a low educational level): AZE, BFA, BGD, IDN, MAR, MDA, 
PAK, PHL, TZA, and UGA. Mid-educated Muslim (Muslim countries with a middle educational level): ALB, 
GEO, JOR, KGZ, MLI, SEN, SRB, TJK, and YEM. High-educated Muslim (Muslim countries with a high 
educational level): ARM, BIH, DZA, EGY, IRQ, MKD, MNE, and TUN. 
 DC LDC 
 Income-equal Income-unequal Income-equal Income-unequal 
Protestant β γ (AUS, LUX, NLD, SWE) 
β* (CHE, DNK, FIN, 
HKG, ISL, NZL USA) 
  
Non-Protestant 
Christian 
γ* (IRL, BEL, GBR, 
GRC, UKR, AUT) 
γ β (CHL, FRA, ITA, 
POL, SVK) 
 ¬ γ (Mid-educated ex-SU, 
LA, ETH) 
Muslim   
αγ (High-
educated),≈ αγ 
(TUR) 
α* (Low-educated), ¬ α 
(Mid-educated),≈ α (IRN) 
Jewish  β* (ISR)   
Hindu   γ* ≈ γ (IND) 
Buddhist   (αβ)* ¬ γ (BTN, KHM, LKA, THA, VNM) 
Atheist β* (CZE, HVR)  β* (High-educated 
ex-SU) β* (KOR) 
 
These results are consistent with predictions if religions account for the prevailing attitudes, with 
the following constancies: α attitudes are dominant in Muslim LDCs, with larger γ shares in more 
educated countries; a prevalence of β attitudes in Protestant DCs, with larger γ shares in less 
income-unequal countries; a prevalence of γ attitudes in non-Protestant Christian DCs, with larger β 
shares in more income-unequal countries; and a prevalence of β attitudes in more educated atheist 
and Jewish countries. 
Indeed, the Muslim maxim “That which is left by Allah for you (after accounting for the rights of 
the people) is better for you” (Surat Hud, Ayah 86) seems to evoke an α attitude (see also Hamidi et 
al., 2010); the Protestant maxim that “Vocation from God is not limited to clergy or church, but it 
can be applied to any occupation or trade” (Luther, 1520) suggests a β attitude (see also van Hoorn 
and Maseland, 2013); the Non-Protestant Christian maxim that “Only in God will one find the truth 
and happiness one never stops searching for” (St. Augustine, 401) seems to evoke a γ attitude (see 
also Vayalilkarottu, 2012); and the many Jewish commandments concerning the kashrut (fitness) of 
one’s money in the Torah, which are expanded upon in the Mishnah and the Talmud, suggest a β 
attitude (see also Van Praag et al., 2010). 
The following additional insights were obtained from my analysis. First, movements towards a 
modern (i.e., market oriented) society implied an increase in β, both in atheist and Non-Protestant 
Christian societies. Some of these societies have firmly moved to β (CYP, CZE, MEX, MLT, and 
PRT), some are moving in this direction (CHL, FRA, HVR, ITA, POL, and SVK), and some have 
not yet completed this movement (ESP). Second, the economic crisis reduced β (HKG and ISL) and 
increased γ (CHE, DNK, FIN, and USA) in Protestant societies, whereas poor and income-unequal 
societies adopted an α attitude, both for Non-Protestant Christian countries (BWA, CMR, COL, 
JAM, MDA, MNG, and NIC) and Protestant countries (GHA, MDG, and NAM). Third, Buddhist 
countries could not be simply characterised, since this religion cannot be linked to any single 
typified attitude (α or β or γ), but rather combined aspects of the α and β attitudes; BTN, KHM, 
LKA, THA, and VNM could be better represented as a non-γ group. Fourth, attitudes could not be 
characterised when many religions had high representation in a country: DEU (30% Non-Protestant 
Christian, 30% Protestant, 20% atheist), CMR (38% Catholic, 15% Protestant Christian, 22% 
Muslim), MDG (22% Catholic, 22% Protestant, 50% local religions), MUS (49% Hindu, 32% 
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Protestant, 17% Muslim), QAT (77% Muslim, 12% Hindu, 10% Protestant), and CHN (57% Taoist, 
25% atheist, 14% Buddhist). 
Therefore, attitudes for a representative individual at a country level seem to be accounted for by 
the most popular religion combined with the observed education and inequality levels when certain 
short-run dynamics (e.g., a crisis) or long-term dynamics (e.g., market orientations) hold. 
6.Discussion 
In this paper, I developed an original analytical model that accounts for three main attitudes towards 
life (i.e., α, β, and γ for Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic attitudes, respectively). The model 
accounts for all variables that have been shown by empirical and theoretical studies to affect health 
and happiness at an individual level for a general population (i.e., employment, occupation type, 
education, ethical freedom, opportunity distribution), and considers three main approaches (i.e., ex-
ante behavioural or statistical, ex-post behavioural). 
The model permitted an empirical test based on reasonable assumptions such as compensation for 
individual lucky and unlucky events at a country level, and the prevalence of equilibrium attitudes 
in the long-run. 
The model can explain the results of some empirical studies. For example, Bjørnskov (2008) found 
an inverse relationship between happiness (ha) and longevity (he) at the country level. The present 
model can explain this result by considering the impacts of ethical freedom on health (∂he/∂fr>0) 
and happiness (∂ha/∂fr<0), and by assuming that the latter effect is larger than the former; that is, 
∂he/∂fr+∂ha/∂fr<0. Blanchflower & Oswald (2008, 2009) found a U-shaped curve for 
psychological well-being (he, based on psychiatric assessment scores, mental health levels, and 
depression and anxiety levels) over an individual’s life cycle, with the minimum score in middle 
age. The present model can explain this result by remembering the impacts of attitudes on health 
(i.e., ∂he/∂β>∂he/∂α>∂he/∂γ>0), and by assuming that a β attitude prevails in young people 
(because the δ value is close to 0), a γ attitude prevails in middle-aged people, and an α attitude 
prevails in old people. 
The model can confirm the insights obtained from some theoretical studies. For example, Zagonari 
(2009) found higher and lower happiness levels in Protestant and non-Protestant Christian 
countries, respectively. This can be replicated with the current model by stressing that in the two-
equation dynamic model (i.e., dhe=∂he/∂fr dfr+∂he/∂y dy+dha, dha=α ∂ha/∂y dy–α ∂ha/∂fr dfr+β 
dy+γ dy+dhe) the health level could be fixed (i.e., dhe=0) rather than the happiness level (dha=0), 
and by assuming that the impact of ethical freedom on health (∂he/∂fr>0) is smaller than the impact 
of ethical freedom on happiness for the α attitude (–α ∂ha/∂fr>0) (i.e., ∂he/∂fr–α ∂ha/∂fr<0). 
7.Conclusions 
The analytical approach adopted in the present study successfully accounted for the effects of 
culture on happiness and health by emphasising measurable individual characteristics (i.e., 
education, employment, occupation) as well as measurable social characteristics (ethical freedom, 
equity in achievements). 
However, some caveats concerning the results obtained in this paper need to be highlighted. I 
normalised ha* to 1 in order to obtain an analytical solution. However, the present analysis showed 
that the relationship between happiness, health, and ethical freedom was consistent with the 
relationship between happiness and ethical freedom discussed in Zagonari (2009). I tested the 
robustness of the analytical model by assuming that people are neither lucky nor unlucky on 
average, and by applying the average values at u*=0. Alternatively, one could estimate a dynamic 
econometric model with cross-country time-series individual data with error values that could 
potentially characterise each individual. However, few countries and even fewer cultures present 
these kinds of datasets. I disregarded a possible preference for large variability in the short-run 
achievements over a large mean in the long-run achievement by comparing happiness, health, and 
achievements in the long-run. Alternatively, one could account for short-term fluctuations in 
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choosing their attitude. I tested the robustness of the analytical model by presenting qualitative 
insights related to fr, α, β, and γ. Alternatively, one could obtain an econometric estimation of these 
parameters using cross-country individual data. However, few countries and even fewer cultures 
present these kinds of datasets. I disregarded the potential for remorse in the ex-post behavioural 
approach. Alternatively, one could account for regret in choosing their attitude. I tested the 
robustness of the analytical model by assuming that people are observed at a long-run equilibrium 
and by looking for insights into α, β, and γ at this equilibrium. Alternatively, one could estimate a 
dynamic econometric model with cross-country time-series individual data and α, β, and γ values 
that change over time. However, few countries and even fewer cultures present these kinds of 
datasets. 
The main future developments for the framework suggested in this paper are as follows. It may be 
worth estimating coefficients to be attached to the model variables from alternative cultural contexts 
such as Russia (Graham et al., 2004), Peru (Izquierdo, 2005), Sweden (Andersson, 2008), Japan 
(Oshio & Kobayashi, 2010) and the United States (Borgonovi, 2008), possibly by relying on a 
cross-country time-series dataset. It may be worth characterising the ethical and religious traditions 
in terms of typified attitudes, for example, by emphasising combinations of α and β attitudes in 
Buddhism (Bilimoria et al., 2008; Tomer, 2011). 
Appendix 
If γ=1, under the assumptions that u=0, fy=fh=0, and ha*=0 to depict the normalised situations at a 
country level, ∂y*/∂α=fr (em+ed–1+3 fr)/(α+2 fr)2, where ∂y*/∂α>0 if fr>0 and fr>(1–ed–em)/3 or if 
fr<0 and fr<(1–ed–em)/3. These conditions are unlikely to be met, because they require the 
prevalence of features characterizing Protestant DCs (e.g., negative fr) combined with features 
characterizing LDCs (e.g., small ed and em). We can assume that y* negatively depends on α. If 
α=1, under the assumptions that u=0, fy=fh=0, and ha*=0 to depict the normalised situations at a 
country level, ∂y*/∂γ=fr [1–fr+fr (1+em+ed+fr)]/(1+fr+γ fr)2, where ∂y*/∂γ>0 if fr>0 and fr>(1/2) 
{–ed–em+Sqrt[(em+ed)2–4]} or if fr<0 and fr<(1/2) {–ed–em–Sqrt[(em+ed)2–4]}. These conditions 
are unlikely to be met, because they require the prevalence of features characterizing Protestant 
DCs (e.g., negative fr) combined with features characterizing LDCs (e.g., small ed and em). We can 
assume that y* negatively depends on γ. Note that these results are reasonable, since it is likely that, 
on average, y* is larger if a β attitude prevails. 
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Supplementary Materials 
Table S. Estimated fr and differences between the estimated and observed per capita GDP for different extreme 
values of attitudes α and γ. Country codes are from the World Bank Development Indicators dataset. 
 fr fr α=0 α=0 α=1 α=1 α=0 α=0 α=1 α=1 
   γ=0 γ=0 γ=0 γ=0 γ=1 γ=1 γ=1 γ=1 
 
2003-07 2008-12 2003-07 2008-12 2003-07 2008-12 2003-07 2008-12 2003-07 2008-12 
Country code           
AFG         
  
AGO         
  
ALB 2.13 1.65 –0.94 –0.89 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.74 0.69 
ARE         
  
ARG 0.56 0.75 –1.33 –1.62 –0.02 –0.09 –0.13 –0.24 0.30 0.33 
ARM 1.75 1.46 0.72 –0.30 1.33 0.61 1.22 0.60 1.49 0.95 
ATG 1.35 1.53       
  
AUS –1.42 –1.43 –2.09 –1.97 0.33 0.84 –1.38 –1.34 –0.36 –0.28 
AUT –0.64 –1.00 –2.27 –2.12 –2.82 146.11 –1.54 –1.44 2.11 –0.05 
AZE 2.35 2.05 –1.45 –1.61 –0.14 –0.30 0.03 –0.17 0.57 0.37 
BDI         
  
BEL –1.04 –0.91 –1.81 –1.70 21.75 –9.93 –1.23 –1.12 0.25 0.69 
BEN 2.75 2.59       
  
BFA 2.68 2.64 –1.54 –1.53 –0.14 –0.13 0.10 0.11 0.70 0.71 
BGD 2.99 2.83 –1.83 –1.67 –0.39 –0.26 –0.02 0.05 0.57 0.64 
21 
 
BGR 1.49 1.06 –1.67 –1.59 –0.33 –0.30 –0.32 –0.34 0.24 0.16 
BHR 0.75 1.08       
  
BHS         
  
BIH 2.30 1.98 0.60 0.37 1.26 1.04 1.09 0.93 1.42 1.24 
BLR 0.83 0.38 –2.09 –1.91 –0.34 –0.20 –0.42 –0.44 0.17 0.07 
BLZ 2.33 2.19       
  
BOL 1.77 1.86 –1.82 –1.94 –0.27 –0.37 –0.25 –0.32 0.46 0.39 
BRA         
  
BRB –0.33 –0.22         
BRN         
  
BTN 2.67 2.51 –1.83 –1.74 –0.41 –0.35 –0.15 –0.13 0.46 0.46 
BWA 1.92 1.80 0.19 0.37 0.80 0.89 0.82 0.93 1.12 1.17 
CAF         
  
CAN         
  
CHE –0.98 –1.29 –2.27 –2.09 –49.45 3.37 –1.70 –1.70 –0.04 –0.36 
CHL 1.00 0.47 –1.78 –1.65 –0.44 –0.40 –0.52 –0.51 0.02 –0.11 
CHN 2.67 2.42 –2.16 –2.10 –0.66 –0.64 –0.42 –0.46 0.26 0.21 
CIV         
  
CMR 2.72 2.56 –1.67 –1.56 –0.26 –0.16 –0.04 0.03 0.60 0.66 
COG 2.85 2.66       
  
COL 1.90 1.62 –1.09 –1.11 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.64 0.60 
COM         
  
CPV         
  
CRI 2.02 1.42 –1.97 –1.68 –0.57 –0.32 –0.49 –0.34 0.14 0.25 
CYP 0.48 0.03 –2.17 –1.71 –1.08 –1.11 –1.11 –0.91 –0.82 –1.09 
CZE 0.63 0.27 –2.19 –2.06 –0.94 –0.82 –1.00 –0.92 –0.61 –0.64 
DEU –0.66 –0.56 –1.73 –1.89 –3.23 –2.50 –1.15 –1.23 2.79 8.87 
DJI         
  
DMA         
  
DNK –1.67 –1.38 –2.14 –1.76 –0.19 1.81 –1.46 –1.25 –0.59 –0.16 
DOM 1.89 1.81 –0.66 –0.77 0.39 0.28 0.39 0.29 0.86 0.76 
DZA 2.36 2.17 –0.69 –1.38 0.35 –0.11 0.37 0.00 0.82 0.53 
ECU 1.61 1.70 –1.57 –1.79 –0.19 –0.35 –0.17 –0.31 0.42 0.32 
EGY 2.06 2.10 –1.34 –1.25 –0.03 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.63 0.65 
ERI         
  
ESP –0.70 –0.77 –1.77 –0.39 –2.55 –7.07 –1.02 –0.23 2.06 3.63 
EST 0.15 0.19 –1.95 –1.30 –0.47 –0.44 –0.69 –0.38 –0.35 –0.31 
ETH 2.83 2.72 –0.28 –0.24 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.84 1.29 1.30 
FIN –1.92 –1.65 –1.83 –1.69 0.00 0.58 –1.19 –1.09 –0.35 –0.16 
FJI         
  
FRA –0.55 –0.37 –1.74 –1.53 –2.29 –1.83 –1.07 –0.92 39.11 –3.53 
FSM         
  
GAB         
  
GBR –1.08 –0.66 –2.11 –1.66 7.00 –2.96 –1.38 –1.01 0.18 5.50 
GEO 1.58 2.03 –0.84 –0.39 0.37 0.63 0.38 0.63 0.90 1.09 
GHA 2.87 2.73 –1.76 –1.66 –0.33 –0.25 –0.03 0.02 0.59 0.63 
GIN         
  
GMB         
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GNB         
  
GNQ         
  
GRC –1.28 –0.83 –1.61 –0.86 0.97 –5.92 –0.82 –0.33 0.27 2.13 
GRD         
  
GTM 2.56 2.54 –2.22 –1.97 –0.69 –0.51 –0.53 –0.36 0.21 0.35 
GUY         
  
HKG –0.58 –1.46 –1.90 –1.95 –3.51 1.81 –1.31 –1.42 –19.86 0.26 
HND 2.69 2.57 –2.06 –1.96 –0.57 –0.48 –0.42 –0.36 0.32 0.38 
HRV 0.98 0.70 –1.41 –1.26 –0.35 –0.31 –0.36 –0.30 0.01 –0.02 
HTI         
  
HUN 0.29 0.43 –2.04 –1.45 –0.55 –0.43 –0.73 –0.43 –0.34 –0.19 
IDN 2.57 2.36 –1.31 –1.49 –0.02 –0.13 0.16 0.05 0.72 0.62 
IND 2.78 2.60 –1.87 –1.95 –0.43 –0.47 –0.11 –0.18 0.50 0.44 
IRL –1.39 –1.26 –2.27 –1.11 1.22 6.63 –1.72 –0.92 –0.51 0.72 
IRN 2.18 1.59 –1.53 –1.42 –0.29 –0.16 –0.21 –0.14 0.35 0.39 
IRQ 2.67 2.61 0.06 –0.55 0.98 0.53 0.92 0.59 1.34 1.05 
ISL –1.47 –1.23 –2.35 –1.81 –0.35 2.37 –1.58 –1.16 –0.65 0.01 
ISR –0.21 –0.15 –1.67 –1.79 –1.02 –0.96 –0.79 –0.86 –1.37 –1.17 
ITA –0.63 –0.39 –2.04 –1.72 –1.98 –1.54 –1.20 –0.95 3.00 –3.47 
JAM 2.16 2.12 –1.27 –0.94 –0.05 0.21 0.02 0.25 0.56 0.77 
JOR 1.87 1.77 –1.02 –0.93 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.79 0.80 
JPN –0.52 –0.30 –2.34 –2.13 –1.69 –1.35 –1.41 –1.20 –13.19 –2.05 
KAZ 0.97 1.26 –1.47 –1.63 –0.09 –0.28 –0.11 –0.25 0.36 0.24 
KEN 2.74 2.74       
  
KGZ 1.84 1.95 –1.44 –1.42 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.73 0.73 
KHM 3.05 2.77 –2.26 –2.22 –0.74 –0.67 –0.31 –0.30 0.34 0.36 
KIR         
  
KOR –1.29 –1.34 –2.35 –2.11 –2.95 –1.62 –1.15 –1.03 –0.34 –0.12 
KWT –1.06 –0.38       
  
LAO         
  
LBN 1.30 1.23       
  
LBR         
  
LBY         
  
LCA 2.27 2.18       
  
LKA 2.84 2.67 –1.82 –1.89 –0.42 –0.47 –0.21 –0.28 0.44 0.38 
LSO         
  
LTU –0.03 –0.18 –1.76 –1.00 –0.19 –0.46 –0.50 –0.17 –0.22 –0.74 
LUX –2.67 –2.74 –2.06 –1.82 1.20 1.41 –2.92 –2.73 –1.83 –1.65 
LVA –0.04 0.14 –1.72 –0.79 –0.08 –0.20 –0.44 0.00 –0.13 –0.09 
MAC –1.71 –2.82 –2.21 –2.12 0.17 0.20 –1.66 –2.22 –0.63 –1.25 
MAR 2.78 2.66 –1.28 –1.34 –0.02 –0.06 0.15 0.10 0.71 0.67 
MDA 1.94 2.02 –1.58 –1.63 –0.11 –0.16 0.04 0.00 0.64 0.61 
MDG 2.85 2.83 –1.59 –1.56 –0.20 –0.17 0.03 0.04 0.67 0.69 
MDV 2.94 2.59       
  
MEX 1.90 1.76 –2.30 –1.99 –0.85 –0.65 –0.77 –0.61 –0.13 –0.01 
MKD 2.18 1.73 1.23 1.07 1.64 1.40 1.44 1.29 1.67 1.46 
MLI 2.75 2.70 –1.03 –0.95 0.23 0.28 0.39 0.43 0.94 0.98 
MLT 1.08 0.75 –2.00 –1.84 –0.88 –0.84 –0.88 –0.84 –0.48 –0.53 
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MNE 1.95 1.05 0.24 –0.24 0.90 0.42 0.74 0.42 1.04 0.64 
MNG 1.57 1.38 –1.49 –1.59 –0.01 –0.04 0.07 0.00 0.66 0.59 
MOZ 2.68 2.59       
  
MRT         
  
MUS 2.26 1.67 –1.84 –1.67 –0.54 –0.39 –0.40 –0.34 0.16 0.18 
MWI         
  
MYS 1.76 1.51 –2.37 –2.19 –0.87 –0.73 –0.81 –0.72 –0.16 –0.11 
NAM 2.49 2.44 0.27 0.79 1.07 1.43 1.03 1.36 1.45 1.70 
NER 2.95 2.92       
  
NGA 2.49 2.49       
  
NIC 2.63 2.62 –1.80 –1.56 –0.37 –0.20 –0.12 0.01 0.50 0.61 
NLD –1.30 –1.31 –2.15 –1.98 1.49 1.90 –1.52 –1.40 –0.35 –0.20 
NOR –2.88 –2.64 –2.21 –2.16 –0.31 0.01 –2.05 –2.10 –1.25 –1.24 
NPL         
  
NZL –1.09 –0.88 –2.22 –1.84 –2.09 –2.85 –1.18 –0.95 –0.13 0.71 
OMN 1.58 1.28       
  
PAK 3.10 2.92 –1.73 –1.73 –0.35 –0.33 0.01 0.01 0.58 0.58 
PAN 1.33 1.27 –1.41 –1.81 –0.12 –0.43 –0.15 –0.47 0.40 0.12 
PER 1.78 1.50 –1.77 –1.90 –0.32 –0.40 –0.26 –0.38 0.37 0.25 
PHL 2.14 2.16 –1.31 –1.42 0.03 –0.05 0.13 0.06 0.72 0.67 
PLW         
  
PNG         
  
POL 0.47 0.22 –0.99 –1.62 –0.10 –0.40 –0.07 –0.50 0.14 –0.24 
PRT 0.19 0.10 –2.03 –1.34 –0.81 –0.68 –0.91 –0.51 –0.66 –0.60 
PRY 2.17 1.95 –1.67 –1.73 –0.26 –0.27 –0.18 –0.22 0.48 0.45 
QAT –2.15 –1.47 –3.03 –3.07 0.31 2.61 –3.19 –3.03 –1.88 –1.33 
ROU 1.39 0.87 –1.95 –1.79 –0.47 –0.40 –0.42 –0.46 0.14 0.02 
RUS 0.20 –0.11 –1.83 –1.71 –0.17 –0.41 –0.48 –0.60 0.00 –0.54 
RWA 2.73 2.71       
  
SAU 0.89 0.47       
  
SDN         
  
SEN 2.90 2.81 –1.11 –1.01 0.14 0.22 0.31 0.37 0.88 0.93 
SGP         
  
SLB         
  
SLE         
  
SLV 2.37 2.29 –1.81 –1.66 –0.41 –0.29 –0.26 –0.16 0.37 0.45 
SRB 1.39 1.31 –0.53 –0.32 0.40 0.48 0.39 0.46 0.74 0.76 
STP         
  
SUR         
  
SVK 1.20 0.58 –1.26 –1.30 –0.31 –0.49 –0.32 –0.45 0.03 –0.25 
SVN –0.63 –0.62 –2.26 –1.93 –0.42 –0.75 –1.11 –0.89 0.77 1.61 
SWE –1.80 –1.28 –1.94 –1.63 0.11 3.22 –1.36 –1.18 –0.51 –0.01 
SWZ         
  
SYC         
  
SYR 2.77 2.60       
  
TCD         
  
TGO 2.70 2.57       
  
THA 1.48 1.39 –2.36 –2.31 –0.64 –0.59 –0.69 –0.66 0.09 0.10 
24 
 
TJK 2.54 2.50 –1.09 –0.96 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.43 0.90 0.94 
TKM         
  
TLS 2.47 2.51       
  
TON 3.18 3.09       
  
TTO 1.62 1.51       
  
TUN 2.22 2.02 –1.30 –1.02 –0.08 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.54 0.64 
TUR 1.53 0.97 –1.45 –1.25 –0.25 –0.17 –0.23 –0.18 0.26 0.20 
TZA 2.76 2.73 –1.54 –1.57 –0.15 –0.18 0.11 0.09 0.71 0.68 
UGA 2.72 2.68 –1.62 –1.44 –0.21 –0.07 0.03 0.13 0.66 0.75 
UKR 0.78 0.67 –1.69 –1.50 0.00 0.12 –0.10 0.00 0.46 0.52 
URY 1.20 0.70 –1.24 –1.68 –0.03 –0.25 –0.05 –0.37 0.43 0.14 
USA –2.74 –2.48 –2.02 –1.48 –0.11 0.76 –1.69 –1.25 –0.70 –0.16 
UZB         
  
VCT         
  
VEN 1.38 0.37 –1.22 –1.55 –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 –0.24 0.43 0.22 
VNM 2.79 2.60 –2.25 –2.22 –0.71 –0.67 –0.33 –0.33 0.32 0.32 
VUT 2.72 2.70       
  
WSM         
  
YEM 2.75 2.75 –0.51 –0.42 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.69 1.12 1.17 
ZAF         
  
ZMB         
  
 
 
